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STATUTORY PENALTIES AND CLASS ACTIONS: SOCIAL 




Privacy protection involves a particularly knotty set of questions for 
consumer protection laws.  Increasingly complex technology and the 
exponential proliferation of electronic data storage have created an ever-
increasing risk of exposing consumer data to unauthorized access and 
identity theft.  The decreasing cost of and access to communications 
technology has created the ability to bombard consumers with spam and 
other unwanted communications.   Consumers themselves are highly 
supportive of legislation enacted to protect their private data from unau-
thorized transfer, use, and disclosure and from unnecessary intrusions 
into their right to be left alone.  On the other hand, determining appropri-
ate civil remedies for violations of these laws is difficult because injuries 
resulting from a privacy breach are often unquantifiable. 
Statutory damages offer a solution for many of these competing 
problems.  The prospect of a set monetary recovery of $100, $1,000, or 
even $5,000 for each violation of a privacy law may incentivize plaintiffs 
to pursue claims for violations when they otherwise would not bother to 
do so.  Statutory damages also provide a solution to the problem of actual 
damages being difficult to quantify.  Making a company or individual 
liable for a specific amount of statutory damages for each violation cre-
ates a financial deterrent to unscrupulous behavior and an inducement to 
adopt measures that protect customer and other consumer data.   
STATUTORY DAMAGES AND CLASS ACTIONS 
Despite these laudable goals, the ability to aggregate statutory dam-
ages across large populations of consumers makes privacy laws with 
statutory damages remedies highly susceptible to abuse.  Statutory dam-
ages cases are an attractive target for consumer class actions because the 
pre-specified amount and the arguably automatic nature of the remedy 
can eliminate key barriers to class certification in consumer class actions, 
such as proof of specific injury and damages.  Aggregating thousands or 
even millions of individual claims for statutory damages creates the po-
tential for huge monetary exposure, and therefore huge settlements.  
Huge settlements, in turn, create huge contingent fees.  
  
 † Mr. Karlsgodt is a partner at Baker & Hostetler LLP in Denver, where he serves as the 
Denver Office Litigation Coordinator and is the national chair of the firm’s Class Action Defense 
practice team.  He is the editor and primary contributor to the legal blog www.classactionblawg.com.  
Paul Karlsgodt served as Articles Editor for the University of Denver Law Review in 1996-97. 
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Statutory damages class actions often threaten companies and indi-
viduals with annihilating civil exposure for technical violations of laws 
that do not create any appreciable injuries to consumers, or that are far in 
excess of any actual injury.  The exposure is often so large that the 
amount of the potential recovery alone can be used as leverage to con-
vince a defendant to settle, regardless of the merits of the underlying 
claims. 
PRIVACY LAWS WITH STATUTORY DAMAGES OR PENALTY REMEDIES 
Laws providing for statutory damages or penalties in the privacy ar-
ea generally fall into two categories: 1) laws prohibiting certain acts of 
invasion of privacy; and 2) laws prohibiting the intentional or negligent 
disclosure of private information. 
An example of a statute prohibiting invasions of privacy is the fed-
eral Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),
1
 which prohibits unso-
licited automated communications, including faxes and robo-calls.  
Courts have recently interpreted the TCPA to also prohibit unsolicited 
text messages.
2
  Statutory penalties for violations start at $500 per call 
and can be trebled to $1,500 for willful and wanton violations.
3
 
There are numerous laws imposing statutory penalties for intention-
al or negligent disclosures of personal information.  These laws have 
recently been the subject of class actions arising from data breaches in 
various contexts.
4
   California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information 
Act (CMIA) entitles a person to $1,000 in “nominal” damages for a re-
lease of confidential medical information.
5
  The CMIA has recently been 
the subject of numerous data breach class actions against hospitals and 
other health care providers.  These suits have arisen out of thefts of com-
puters or other unintentional acts that allegedly compromised patient 
data, notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of identity theft or other 
unauthorized use of the data following the theft.  The remedies sought by 
the plaintiffs in some of these cases exceed $1 billion in “nominal” dam-
ages. 
  
 1. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2010). 
 2. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (2009). 
 3. Another example is the California Privacy Act, Section 630 et seq., California Penal 
Code, which prohibits monitoring or recording of confidential telephone conversations without the 
consent of both parties to the conversation, and imposes a statutory penalty of $5,000. 
 4. Two examples include the federal Fair and Accurate Transactions Act (FACTA), 15 
U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2012), which prohibits merchants from printing more than five digits of a 
consumer’s credit card number on a credit card receipt and imposes damages of “not less than $100 
and not more than $1,000” per violation, and the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 
(2013), which prohibits disclosure of consumer data about consumers’ video habits and imposes up 
to $2,500 per violation. 
 5. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 56.36(B) (West 2013). 
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THE DEBATE OVER CLASS ACTIONS FOR ANNIHILATING STATUTORY 
DAMAGES 
Proponents of class actions for statutory damages or penalties may 
argue that they are a necessary deterrent to intentional, reckless, or negli-
gent behavior, and that they are justified by the difficulty in assessing 
damages for real but unquantifiable harm. Even conceding that these 
objectives are legitimate, the existence of legitimate objectives doesn’t 
answer the question of whether allowing aggregated statutory damages is 
the best way to achieve them.  Deterrence can also be achieved through 
existing regulation and governmental oversight.
6
  In practical application, 
data privacy class actions often do little to provide affected individuals 
with any significant monetary recovery.  Settlements in privacy cases 
often involve no direct monetary benefits to class members because the 




Proponents also argue that privacy class actions are usually settled 
for far less than the maximum amount of possible statutory damages, so 
damages in these cases are not in fact annihilating.  This pragmatic ar-
gument is hardly a justification for creating the threat of potentially 
bankrupting liability for trivial breaches of privacy interests. What’s 
more, the possibility of an astronomical statutory exposure that bears no 
reasonable nexus either to any conceivable harm or wrongdoing by the 
defendant puts the court in an impossible situation in evaluating the fair-
ness of any settlement.  In a case where the possible statutory damages 
are $1 billion, what is a fair settlement?  $1 million?  $10 million?  $100 
million?  If legislation provides no guidance for this question, the court’s 
decision becomes arbitrary.  If no one really believes that the full amount 
of the statutory damages will ever be awarded, the law should reflect that 
reality. 
EXISTING JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS 
Court decisions have tempered the devastating impact of statutory 
damages class actions in some circumstances, but each judicial solution 
has its loopholes. 
  
 6. See, e.g., Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) 
Act, passed as part of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-
5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act. 
 7. See, e.g., Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement and Provisional Class Certification 
Order, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV-11-01726-RS, 2012 WL 6013427, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 
2012).  The settlement as preliminarily approved in Fraley entitles class members to make a claim 
for a cash award of up to $10 out of a common fund, but if the number of claimants is so high that 
each claimant’s proportionate share would be less than $5, then the entire amount will be paid to 
charity.  See Joint Motion for Settlement, Fraley, No. CV-11-01726-RS (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2012); 
Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised Settlement (dated October 12, 2012), Fraley, No. 
CV-11-01726-RS (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2012), Attachment 1. 
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In some contexts, the lack of injury prevents statutory damages 
class actions from being pursued in the federal courts on the ground that 
the Article III injury-in-fact standing requirement has not been satisfied.
8
  
However, state law standing requirements are often less stringent, and 
standing can often be established simply where a person is within the 
class of persons intended to be protected by a statutory damages scheme, 
whether or not the person suffered any measurable injury.
9
 
By contrast, at least one state, New York, has a specific statute pro-
hibiting class actions for statutory penalties.  In Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates v. Allstate,
10
 however, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the New York law is a procedural law that does not apply in federal 
court actions involving New York disputes; therefore, it held that a class 




One argument raised in early class actions involving potentially an-
nihilating statutory damages liability was that the potential of putting a 
defendant out of business defeated the superiority element required for 
class certification.  Courts found that class actions were not the superior 
means of resolving claims because the potential liability in a class action 
would put the defendant out of business and because statutory penalties 
themselves facilitated individual lawsuits.
12
  More recently, as illustrated 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Bateman v. American 
Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
13
 courts have rejected the idea that the potential for 
annihilating liability is a basis for finding a lack of superiority.  
As in the context of large punitive damages awards, due process 
may provide a limitation on aggregation of statutory damages.   The 
practical problem with this limitation is that the defendant may have to 
incur a judgment for the excessive amount before most courts will con-




 8. See, e.g., Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., No. CV-1397-CM, 2009 WL 1938987, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009); but see Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that plaintiff “alleged sufficient facts to confer standing.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 980 (2009). 
 10. 130 S.Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 11. Id. at 1444.  
 12. See, e.g., Spikings v. Cost Plus, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44214 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2007). 
 13. 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 14. See Parker v. Time Warner Enter. Co., 331 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
due process issue was premature at the class certification stage because the threat of annihilating 
damages remained hypothetical).  One way that some courts have addressed due process concerns is 
through the common law doctrine of remittitur. See Sony BMG Music Enter. v. Tennenbaum, 721 F. 
Supp. 2d 85, 121(D. Mass. 2010) (granting Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or Remittitur “in so 
far as it seeks a reduction in the jury’s award on the grounds that it is so grossly excessive as to 
violate the Constitution”). 
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PATHS TO REFORM 
Reform must start with legislative recognition that creating a statu-
tory damages remedy will likely transform the statute into a magnet for 
class actions.  In view of this reality, statutory damages provisions 
should be limited in such a way that they are not susceptible to abuse 
through the aggregation of claims in a class action.  Examples of poten-
tial limits on statutory damages provisions include 1) prohibiting aggre-
gation of statutory damages in class actions altogether; 2) placing specif-
ic statutory caps on the amounts that can be awarded in class actions; 3) 
limiting the individual amounts that could be awarded depending on the 
number of claimants in a particular case; or 4) permitting only opt-in 
collective actions that require the affirmative participation of each plain-
tiff. 
Even these sorts of limitations would not be a perfect solution, 
however.  Limiting class recoveries solves the problem of creating unin-
tentionally high liability, but it also creates the problem of individual 
awards being so small that they cannot economically be distributed to 
class members.  It may be that statutory damages are simply irreconcila-
ble with class action litigation. 
 
